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Abstract
This paper provides a critical assessment of the rules regarding the clarification, supplementation and correction of tenders 
in procedures for the award of public contracts regulated by the EU 2014 Public Procurement Package. It does so through 
a detailed assessment of the transposition of Article 56(3) of Directive 2014/24/EU by means of the post-2017 reform 
version of Article 72 of the Portuguese Code of Public Contracts. The paper concentrates on four main issues: the existence 
of a mere discretionary power or a positive duty to seek clarifications, corrections or supplementations of tenders and 
their accompanying documentation; the constraints imposed on such power or duty; the desirability of unilateral tender 
corrections by the contracting authority; and the transparency given to the correction, supplementation or clarification of 
tenders. The paper assesses each of these issues against the backdrop of the existing case law of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, as well as with a functional approach to the operationalisation of the Portuguese rules on correction, 
supplementation and clarification of tenders for public contracts.
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1. Introduction
In the course of public procurement procedures, 
contracting authorities are often confronted with the 
practical problem of how to treat tenders1 that fail to 
meet all formal and substantive requirements included 
in the tender documentation and, consequently, 
are seemingly non-compliant.2 Sometimes the 
apparent non-compliance will result from an obvious 
* Reader in Economic Law, University of Bristol Law School, 
and Member of the European Commission Stakeholder Expert 
Group in Public Procurement (2015/18). Author of the blog 
www.howtocrackanut.com. All opinions are solely my own. 
Comments welcome: a.sanchez-graells@bristol.ac.uk. I am 
grateful to Marco Rafael Fernandes Caldeira for the invitation 
to contribute an article to this new journal and for assistance 
with the translation of Article 72 of the Portuguese Code. 
1 In this paper, ‘tender’ is used in a loose manner, usually 
including both tenders stricto sensu as well as applications 
or expressions of interest in multi-stage procedures (such 
as restricted procedures).
2 Generally, on the acceptance of tenders non-compliant 
with substantive requirements or procedural formalities, see 
S Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement. 
Regulation in the EU and the UK, vol 1, 3rd edn (London, 
Sweet and Maxwell, 2014) 819-834. For discussion, mainly 
by reference to the Judgment of 29 March 2012 in SAG 
ELV Slovensko and Others, C-599/10, EU:C:2012:191, 
see A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Rejection of abnormally low 
and non-compliant tenders in EU public procurement:
clerical,3 or arithmetical error.4 In other occasions, 
non-compliance may ensue from incompleteness 
of the documentation underpinning the content 
of the tender,5 or from lack of clarity in some of its 
aspects.6 It is also possible that the apparent non-
A comparative view on selected jurisdictions’, in M Comba 
& S Treumer (eds), Award of Contracts in EU Procurements, 
vol 5 European Procurement Law Series (Copenhagen, 
DJØF Publishing, 2013) 273, 287-295. Available at https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2248590, last accessed 17 March 2018. 
3 Eg the omission of a unit price in one of the schedules of the 
tender, which is however reflected in a different part of the 
tender; see Judgment of the General Court of 10 December 
2009, Antwerpse Bouwwerken v Commission, T-195/08, 
EU:T:2009:491. The case law also offers some rather curious 
examples of clerical mistakes; eg whether the use of e-mail 
or mail (and other modes of communication) form part of the 
offer; see Judgment of the General Court of 12 December 
2012, Evropaïki Dynamiki v EFSA, T-457/07, EU:T:2012:671, 
paragraph 240. Or eg the incorrect reference to the relevant 
number of official languages of the EU; see Judgment of the 
General Court of 9 September 2010, Evropaïki Dynamiki v 
Commission, T-300/07, EU:T:2010:372.
4 Whether arithmetical errors are obvious requires careful 
assessment. See eg Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 
21 May 2008, Belfass v Council, T-495/04, EU:T:2008:160.
5 Judgment of 10 October 2013, Manova, C-336/12, 
EU:C:2013:647. Judgment of 6 November 2014, Cartiera 
dell’Adda, C-42/13, EU:C:2014:2345.
6 For example, as to the preference for the award of some lots 
over others; see Judgment of 7 April 2016, Partner Apelski 
Dariusz, C-324/14, EU:C:2016:214, paragraphs 68-69.
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compliance or the relevant correction is linked to the 
requirement to submit samples for the assessment of 
the future supplies.7 Of course, in practice, there can 
be almost endless aspects of a tender that are unclear, 
incomplete or incorrect—leading to a panoply of 
factual circumstances resulting in different degrees 
of non-compliance. The discussion on seemingly 
non-compliant tenders in this paper is generally 
concerned with relatively minor shortcomings, and 
mostly of a procedural or formal nature. In these 
cases, the contracting authority may be willing to 
waive the relevant requirements or seek ways to 
correct, supplement or clarify the tenders to avoid 
their rejection.
Where the contracting authority has explicitly 
established in the tender documentation that the 
relevant shortcoming will result in the rejection 
of the non-compliant tender,8 no waiver is 
possible and the contracting authority is bound to 
automatically reject the tender without carrying out 
any additional assessment.9 In the absence of such 
explicit constraint, however, in situations involving 
this type of shortcomings in the received tenders, 
contracting authorities wishing to retain (ie ‘save’) 
a seemingly non-compliant tender may need to 
request additional information or documentation, 
and/or seek clarification of the content of the 
tender.10 However, the exercise of such discretion 
7 Judgment of 11 May 2017, Archus and Gama, C-131/16, 
EU:C:2017:358.
8 Judgment of 28 February 2018, MA.T.I. SUD, C-523/16, 
EU:C:2018:135, paragraph 49; Judgment of 10 November 
2016, Ciclat, C-199/15, EU:C:2016:853, paragraph 30.
9 On the desirability of mitigating the harshness of this rule 
through the principle of proportionality, see S Treumer, 
‘Award of contracts covered by the EU public procurement 
rules in Denmark’, in Comba & Treumer (eds), Award of 
Contracts in EU Procurements (n 2) 39, 62. However, it 
is worth noting that the same restriction applies where 
the tender documentation has specified automatic 
exclusion grounds and, consequently, the contracting 
authority is under a duty to exclude the economic 
operator, without the possibility of having recourse to a 
moderating proportionality analysis. See Judgment of 14 
December 2016, Connexxion Taxi Services, C-171/15, 
EU:C:2016:948. 
10 The extent to which this is strictly discretionary or 
contracting authorities are at least partially obliged to 
seek clarifications and attempt to ‘save’ seemingly non-
compliant tenders can be debated; see C Risvig Hamer, 
‘Requesting additional information – increase of flexibility 
and competition?’, in GS Ølykke & A Sanchez-Graells 
(eds), Reformation or Deformation of the EU Public 
Procurement Rules (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2016) 235, 
244-247. As argued elsewhere, I think that there are good 
reasons to conceptualise this is as a limited duty to seek 
clarifications embedded in the more general duty of good 
administration; Sanchez-Graells (n 2) 289-293. 
to save seemingly non-compliant tenders cannot be 
unrestricted. It needs to be subject to constraints to 
avoid situations where the contracting authority and/
or the tenderer take the opportunity of engaging in 
corrections, supplementations or clarifications to 
alter the content of the initial tender.11
At EU level, before the adoption of the 2014 Public 
Procurement Package,12 the practical difficulties 
attached to the treatment of seemingly non-
compliant tenders were solely addressed in a limited 
number of CJEU Judgments that operationalised 
the requirements and constraints derived from the 
general principles of EU public procurement law. As a 
result of the recent reform of EU public procurement 
rules and in an attempt to recast that case law,13 the 
possibility of seeking correction, supplementation or 
clarification of seemingly non-compliant tenders has 
been subjected to explicit regulation in Article 56(3) 
of Directive 2014/24/EU,14 according to which
Where information or documentation to be submit-
ted by economic operators is or appears to be incom-
plete or erroneous or where specific documents are 
missing, contracting authorities may, unless otherwise 
provided by the national law implementing this Di-
rective, request the economic operators concerned to 
submit, supplement, clarify or complete the relevant 
information or documentation within an appropriate 
time limit, provided that such requests are made in full 
compliance with the principles of equal treatment and 
transparency.
This provision therefore solely clarifies the 
existence of the possibility to seek correction, 
supplementation or clarification of seemingly non-
compliant tenders. However, it defers the setting of 
more detailed rules to the general principles of EU 
public procurement law (and their interpreting case 
law, which continues to grow15) and to the domestic 
11 Eg by changing the liability rules in the contract; see Judg-
ment of the General Court of 29 October 2015, Vanbreda 
Risk & Benefits v Commission, T-199/14, EU:T:2015:820. 
Or by seeking to rely on the capacities of third parties not 
initially included in the tender; see Judgment of 4 May 
2017, Esaprojekt, C-387/14, EU:C:2017:338.
12 That is, Directive 2014/23/EU, Directive 2014/24/EU 
and Directive 2014/25/EU.
13 For in-depth discussion, see Risvig Hamer (n 10) in totum.
14 [2014] OJ L 94/65. An identical provision exists in the 
regime applicable to utilities procurement; see Art 76(4) of 
Directive 2014/24/25 [2014] OJ L 94/243.
15 Indeed, after the adoption of Directive 2014/24/EU, 
the CJEU has issued important Judgments in this area, 
including Cartiera dell’Adda, EU:C:2014:2345; Partner 
Apelski Dariusz, EU:C:2016:214; Ciclat, EU:C:2016:853; 
Esaprojekt, EU:C:2017:338; Archus and Gama, 
EU:C:2017:358; or MA.T.I. SUD, EU:C:2018:135.
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transposition of the Directive. In that regard, and 
given the peculiarities detailed below, it is interesting 
to assess the transposition in Portugal—which raises 
some interesting questions of compatibility with EU 
law, as well as some tricky challenges for its practical 
application.
It is worth noting that Portugal transposed the 2014 
Public Procurement Package through Decree-Law 
111-B/2017,16 which effected a significant reform 
of the already repeatedly modified 2008 Portuguese 
Code of Public Contracts (PCPC).17 Prior to the 2017 
reform, the modified version of Article 72 of the 2008 
PCPC already included basic rules on the request of 
clarifications, whereby 
(1) The contracting authority may ask competitors 
for any clarification of the submitted tenders that it 
deems necessary for the purpose of analysing and eva-
luating them.
(2) The explanations given by the respective com-
petitors form an integral part of their tenders, provided 
that they do not contradict the information contained 
in the documents already submitted, do not alter or 
complete their attributes, nor aim to fill in omissions 
that would determine their exclusion … 18
In its post-2017 reform version, Article 72 PCPC 
also includes additional explicit rules on the treatment 
of seemingly non-compliant tenders, to the effect that
(3) The contracting authority shall ask that candida-
tes and tenderers correct, within a maximum of five 
days, any irregularities in their applications or tenders 
16 Decreto-Lei n.º 111-B/2017. Diário da República n.º 
168/2017, 2º Suplemento, Série I de 2017-08-31. Availa-
ble in Portuguese at https://dre.pt/pesquisa/-/search/ 
108086621/details/maximized, last accessed 17 March 
2018.
17 Código dos Contratos Públicos, aprovado pelo Decreto- 
-Lei n.º 18/2008. Diário da República n.º 20/2008, Série I 
de 2008-01-29. A consolidated version as of January 2016 is 
available in Portuguese at http://www.base.gov.pt/mediaRep/
inci/files/base_docs/CCPTextoconsolidadojan2016.pdf, last 
accessed 17 March 2018.
18 Own translation from Portuguese. The original text 
establishes that: ‘1 – O júri do procedimento pode pedir aos 
concorrentes quaisquer esclarecimentos sobre as propostas 
apresentadas que considere necessários para efeito da 
análise e da avaliação das mesmas. 2 – Os esclarecimentos 
prestados pelos respetivos concorrentes fazem parte 
integrante das mesmas, desde que não contrariem os 
elementos constantes dos documentos que as constituem, 
não alterem ou completem os respetivos atributos, nem 
visem suprir omissões que determinam a sua exclusão ’. It is 
worth noting that the provision also contained a paragraph 
3 that imposed transparency requirements. These are 
now established in paragraph 5 of the reformed Article 72 
PCPC (see next footnote).
that have been caused by the breach of non-essential 
formalities and that need to be corrected, including 
the presentation of documents that only verify facts 
or qualities pre-existing the date for the submission of 
their application or tender, as long as such correction 
does not affect competition and equal treatment.
(4) The contracting authority shall rectify on its own 
the clerical or calculation errors contained in the appli-
cations or tenders, provided that the existence of the 
errors and the way in which they must be corrected 
are obvious to any observer.
(5) The requests of the contracting authority pur-
suant to paragraphs 1 and 3 and the corresponding 
responses shall be made available on an electronic 
platform used by the contracting authority and all ap-
plicants and tenderers shall be notified without delay.19
In my view, there are four main aspects of the post-
-2017 reform version of Article 72 of the PCPC that 
raise interesting issues, both of compatibility with 
EU law and for its operationalisation.20 The first one 
concerns the interaction between the discretionary 
power to seek clarifications in paragraph 1 and the 
duty to seek clarifications in paragraph 3. The second 
issue results from the compatibility and potential 
additionality of the constraints imposed by the specific 
limits of paragraph 2 and the general reference to 
the principles of competition and equal treatment 
in paragraph 3. The third one regards the imposition 
of a duty to correct clerical and arithmetical errors 
19 Own translation from Portuguese. The original text es-
tablishes that:  ‘3 – O júri deve solicitar aos candidatos e 
concorrentes que, no prazo máximo de cinco dias, proce-
dam ao suprimento das irregularidades das suas propostas 
e candidaturas causadas por preterição de formalidades 
não essenciais e que careçam de suprimento, incluindo a 
apresentação de documentos que se limitem a comprovar 
factos ou qualidades anteriores à data de apresentação da 
proposta ou candidatura, e desde que tal suprimento não 
afete a concorrência e a igualdade de tratamento. 4 – O 
júri procede à retificação oficiosa de erros de escrita ou 
de cálculo contidos nas candidaturas ou propostas, desde 
que seja evidente para qualquer destinatário a existência 
do erro e os termos em que o mesmo deve ser corrigido. 
Os pedidos do júri formulados nos termos dos n.os 1 e 
3, bem como as respetivas respostas, devem ser disponi-
bilizados em plataforma eletrónica utilizada pela entidade 
adjudicante, devendo todos os candidatos e concorrentes 
ser imediatamente notificados desse facto.’
A consolidated version of Art 72 PCPC is available in Portu-
guese at https://dre.pt/web/guest/legislacao-consolidada/-/
lc/114291580/201803171325/73494496/diploma/
indice, last accessed 17 March 2018.
20 Given my limited ability to read the Portuguese 
language, I have not researched the existing literature to 
see if authors have already raised these issues. I can only 
present my excuses for any failure to engage with existing 
academic work in non-English language.
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motu proprio, as well as the boundaries of such 
obligation and the potential effects of its unilaterality. 
The last one concerns the transparency given to 
the correction, supplementation and clarification of 
applications and tenders under paragraph 5. 
The purpose of this paper is to critically reflect 
on each of these issues, using the Portuguese 
transposition of Article 56(3) of Directive 2014/24/EU 
to think more broadly about the possibilities and limits 
for the ‘saving’ of seemingly non-compliant tenders 
in an EU law compatible manner. The remainder of 
the paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides 
a condensed overview of the relevant CJEU case 
law. Section 3 provides a critical assessment of the 
post-2017 version of Article 72 of the PCPC and, 
in particular, assesses the extent to which there is a 
power or a duty to seek clarifications (3.1), explores 
the boundaries of the acceptable clarifications (3.2), 
reflects on the desirability of the unilateral correction 
of tenders (3.3), and raises some issues about 
transparency (3.4). Section 4 briefly concludes.
2. The relevant CJEU case law in a nutshell
As mentioned above, the CJEU has been actively 
engaged in drawing the boundaries of the exercise of 
discretion concerning the treatment of seemingly non-
compliant tenders. Its case law has developed in the 
absence of explicit rules in the pre-2014 generations 
of EU procurement directives. Despite having entered 
into force in April 2016, Article 56(3) of Directive 
2014/24/EU has not yet been directly interpreted by 
the CJEU due to its inapplicability to the underlying 
cases ratione temporis.21 The CJEU post-2014 case 
law thus continues to be framed in the context of 
the absence of an explicit rule in Directive 2004/18/
EC.22 This case law is best understood in terms of 
the requirements derived from general principles 
of EU public procurement law and, in particular, in 
relation to the tension that derives from the principles 
of equal treatment and competition in this context. 
The existing case law will thus remain relevant in 
the application and interpretation of Article 56(3) of 
Directive 2014/4/EU, which explicitly requires ‘full 
compliance with the principles of equal treatment 
and transparency’, and which is in any case subjected 
to further compliance with the general principles of 
procurement in Article 18 thereof, which include the 
principle of competition.
21 This is the case at the time of writing (17 March 2018). 
See eg Opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-
Bordona of 15 November 2017 in MA.T.I. SUD, C-523/16, 
EU:C:2017:868, paragraphs 50-55.
22 [2004] OJ L 134/114.
The principle of equal treatment and the corollary 
transparency requirements establish clear constraints 
on what the contracting authority can accept by way 
of tender correction, supplementation or clarification. 
This results from CJEU case law that has determined 
that ‘the principle of equal treatment of tenderers 
requires that all the tenders comply with the tender 
conditions so as to ensure an objective comparison 
of the tenders submitted by the various tenderers’;23 
and that ‘[t]hat requirement would not be satisfied if 
tenderers were allowed to depart from the basic terms 
of the tender conditions […] except where those terms 
expressly allow them to do so’.24 Therefore,
it is also essential, in the interests of legal certainty, that 
the [contracting authority] be able to ascertain precise-
ly what a tender submitted in the course of a procure-
ment procedure means and, in particular, to determi-
ne whether the tender complies with the conditions 
set out in the contract documents. Thus, where a 
tender is ambiguous and the [contracting authority] is 
not in a position to establish, quickly and efficiently, 
what it actually means, that institution has no choice 
but to reject the tender.25
Consequently, there may seem to be an absolute 
obligation to dismiss non-fully compliant tenders as a 
requirement or corollary of the principles of equality 
of treatment26 and legal certainty. The acceptance or 
rejection of a non-fully compliant tender is thus not 
within the discretion of the contracting authority—
which must reject all non-compliant tenders in order 
to guarantee equality of treatment. However, that 
does not mean that the contracting authority is under 
an automatic obligation to reject, nor that it cannot 
engage in a process of clarification of a seemingly 
non-compliant tender when the contracting authority 
is ‘in a position to establish, quickly and efficiently, 
what [the tender] actually means’. Such exercise can 
be seen not solely as a requirement of the principle 
of good administration,27 but also of the principle of 
competition.28
23 Judgment of 22 June 1993, Commission v Denmark (Sto-
rebaelt), C-243/89, EU:C:1993:257, paragraph 37.
24 Storebaelt, EU:C:1993:257, paragraph 40.
25 Antwerpse Bouwwerken, EU:T:2009:491, paragraph 
58, emphasis added. See also Judgment of the Court of 
First Instance of 27 September 2002, Tideland Signal v 
Commission, T-211/02, EU:T:2002:232, paragraph 34.
26 See P Braun, ‘Selection of Bidders and Contract Award 
Criteria: The Compatibility of Practice in PFI Procurement 
with European Law’ (2001) 10 Public Procurement Law 
Review 1, 12. Cf P Trepte, Public Procurement in the EU: A 
Practitioner’s Guide, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2007) 297.
27 See above (n 10).
28 The importance of this principle will only increase af-
ter its consolidation in Article 18 of Directive 2014/24/EU. 
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Indeed, it is important to stress that an exceedingly 
formal approach to the (automatic) rejection of 
non-fully compliant tenders would have negative 
competitive effects and could deprive the contracting 
authority of what would otherwise be the most 
economically advantageous tender. It should come 
as no surprise that contracting authorities might be 
willing to accept relatively minor deviations from 
the tender requirements provided that, overall, the 
seemingly non-compliant tender is beneficial to their 
interests. Interpreting the silence in Directive 2004/18/
EC as imposing an automatic and non-waivable 
requirement to reject all non-fully compliant tenders 
would have unnecessarily limited the alternatives 
of the contracting authority and defeated the 
purpose of the procurement procedure by imposing 
the contracting of overall second-best solutions. 
Therefore, the CJEU case law progressively created 
space for pro-competitive and non-discriminatory 
clarification of seemingly non-compliant tenders. As 
recently recast, the CJEU case law establishes that 
‘the principle of equal treatment does not preclude 
the correction or amplification of details of a tender, 
where it is clear that they require clarification or where 
it is a question of the correction of obvious clerical 
errors, subject, however, to the fulfilment of certain 
requirements’,29 such as
(i) the fact that a request for clarification of a 
tender cannot be made until after the contracting 
authority has looked at all the tenders and must, as 
a general rule, be sent in an equivalent manner to 
all undertakings which are in the same situation and 
must relate to all sections of the tender which require 
clarification.30
(ii) that request may not lead to the submission by 
a tenderer of what would appear in reality to be a 
new tender.31
See also Article 1-A of the PCPC. For in-depth discus-
sion, see A Sanchez-Graells, Public procurement and the 
EU competition rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2015) ch 5. See also ibid, ‘Some reflections on the “artifi-
cial narrowing of competition” as a check on executive dis-
cretion in public procurement’ in S Bogojević, X Groussot 
& J Hettne (eds), Discretion in EU Public Procurement Law, 
IECL Series (Oxford, Hart Publishing, forthcoming). Avai-
lable at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125304, last accessed 
17 March 2018. 
29 Archus and Gama, EU:C:2017:358, paragraph 29 and the 
case-law cited. See also See Slovensko, EU:C:2012:191, 
paragraph 40, and MA.T.I. SUD, EU:C:2018:135, paragra-
ph 50.
30 See Archus and Gama, EU:C:2017:358, paragraph 30. 
See also Slovensko, EU:C:2012:191, paragraphs 42-44.
31 See Archus and Gama, EU:C:2017:358, paragraph 31, 
Slovensko, EU:C:2012:191, paragraph 40, and MA.T.I. 
SUD, EU:C:2018:135, paragraph 52.
(iii) as a general rule, when exercising its discretion 
as regards the right to ask a tenderer to clarify its 
tender, the contracting authority must treat tenderers 
equally and fairly, in such a way that a request for 
clarification does not appear unduly to have favoured 
or disadvantaged the tenderer or tenderers to which 
the request was addressed, once the procedure for 
selection of tenders has been completed and in the 
light of its outcome.32
(iv) The CJEU also reiterated that ‘a request for 
clarification cannot, however, make up for the lack 
of a document or information whose production was 
required by the contract documents, the contracting 
authority being required to comply strictly with the 
criteria which it has itself laid down’.33 
(v) In addition, and specifically in relation to 
requests for documents, the CJEU case law also 
establishes that the EU rules do not preclude ‘a 
contracting authority from asking a candidate, after 
the deadline for applying to take part in a tendering 
procedure, to provide documents describing that 
candidate’s situation – such as a copy of its published 
balance sheet – which can be objectively shown to 
pre-date that deadline’.34
Therefore, contracting authorities are allowed to 
request clarifications, as long as they are scrupulous in 
avoiding any (perceived) instance of discrimination.35 
The CJEU has stressed that this is a discretionary 
power and not a duty of the contracting authority 
precisely because enabling 
the contracting authority to require a tenderer whose 
tender it regards as imprecise or as failing to meet the 
… requirements of the tender specifications to pro-
vide clarification in that regard would be to run the 
risk of making the contracting authority appear to 
have negotiated with the tenderer on a confidential 
basis, in the event that that tenderer was finally suc-
cessful, to the detriment of the other tenderers and 
in breach of the principle of equal treatment. […] it 
32 See Archus and Gama, EU:C:2017:358, paragraph 
32, and Slovensko, EU:C:2012:191, paragraph 45. One 
can wonder whether the ex post requirement in the test 
imposed by the CJEU is not impossible to meet (probatio 
diabolica), and whether it does not set too high a barrier for 
contracting authorities to effectively engage in clarification 
exercises.
33 See Archus and Gama, EU:C:2017:358, paragraph 33, 
Manova, EU:C:2013:647, paragraph 40, and MA.T.I. SUD, 
EU:C:2018:135, paragraph 51.
34 Manova, EU:C:2013:647, paragraph 42. Cf X Codina 
García-Andrade, ‘Why Manova is not Slovensko: a new 
balance between equal treatment of tenderers and compe-
tition? (2015) Public Procurement Law Review NA109.
35 For critical comments, see D McGowan, ‘An obligation 
to investigate abnormally low bids? SAG ELV Slovensko a.s. 
(C-599/10)’ (2012) Public Procurement Law Review NA 165. 
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does not follow from … any … provision of Directive 
2004/18, or from the principle of equal treatment or 
the obligation of transparency, that, in such a situation, 
the contracting authority is obliged to contact the ten-
derers concerned.36
In my view, however, the argument can be even 
taken further and there is scope for the adoption of 
a ‘possibilistic’ or anti-formalistic approach—oriented 
towards maintaining the maximum possible degree of 
competition by avoiding the rejection of offers on the 
basis of too formal and/or automatic rejection criteria 
for non-compliant offers.37 It is important to underline 
that the relevant case law has already offered some 
guidance that points in this direction by stressing that 
‘the guarantees conferred by the [Union] legal order in 
administrative proceedings include, in particular, the 
principle of good administration, involving the duty of 
the competent institution to examine carefully and 
impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual 
case’38—which, in the case of public procurement, 
should be interpreted as requiring contracting 
authorities to exercise due care in the evaluation of 
the tenders submitted by tenderers,39 and possibly 
creating a positive duty to seek or carry out corrections 
of errors.40 To be sure, the obligation of contracting 
authorities to review the tenders for possible mistakes 
and to contact tenderers to seek for correction or 
supplementation is limited as a mandate of the 
principle of non-discrimination; but the scope for 
clarification of the tenders and for the establishment 
of rules allowing for a flexible treatment of formally 
non-compliant tenders, support the adoption of this 
possibilistic approach in the evaluation of tenders 
(as a specification of the duty of due care or diligent 
administration required of contracting authorities).
In this regard, as reasoned by the EU case law, 
the contracting authority is under an obligation to 
conduct the revision of the tenders in accordance 
with the principle of good administration (Art 41 
CFREU)41 and is, consequently, under an obligation to 
36 Slovensko, EU:C:2012:191, paragraphs 37-38, empha-
sis added.
37 As mentioned, this will more clearly be the case under Art 
56(3) in combination with Art 18(1) of Directive 2014/24/
EU; Sanchez-Graells, Public procurement and competition 
rules (n 28) 321-323.
38 Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 14 February 
2006, TEA-CEGOS and Others v Commission, T-376/05, 
EU:T:2006:47, paragraph 76, emphasis added.
39 TEA-CEGOS, EU:T:2006:47, paragraph 83.
40 Along the same lines, Arrowsmith (n 2) 821-824.
41 Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (OJ 2007 C 303/1). On this general 
principle of EU administrative law, see T Fortsakis, 
‘Principles Governing Good Administration’ (2005) 11 
European Public Law 207. Of particular relevance here is
exercise the power to ask for additional information 
in circumstances where the clarification of a tender is 
clearly both practically possible and necessary, and as 
long as the exercise of that duty to seek clarification is 
in accordance with the principle of equal treatment.42 
This means that the contracting authority is to adopt 
an anti-formalistic approach that renders the effective 
appraisal of the tenders possible—regardless of 
minor deficiencies, ambiguities or apparent mistakes. 
Indeed, as stressed by the jurisprudence, in cases 
where the terms of a tender themselves and the 
surrounding circumstances known to the authority 
indicate that the ambiguity probably has a simple 
explanation and can be easily resolved, then, in 
principle, it is contrary to the requirements of good 
administration to reject the tender without exercising 
its power to seek clarification. A decision to reject a 
tender in such circumstances is, consequently, liable 
to be vitiated by a manifest error of assessment on the 
part of the contracting authority,43 and could result in 
an unnecessary restriction of competition. 
Therefore, contracting authorities should ensure 
that the evaluation of tenders leading to the award 
of the contract is based on the substance of the 
tenders—by adopting a possibilistic or anti-formalist 
approach that excludes purely formal decisions that 
restrict competition unnecessarily; subject, always, to 
guaranteeing compliance with the principle of equal 
treatment. Nonetheless, it is important to stress that 
the duty of good administration does not go so far as to 
require the contracting authority to seek clarification 
in every case where a tender is ambiguously drafted.44 
Particularly as regards calculations and other possible 
non-obvious clerical mistakes, the duty of good 
administration is considerably more restricted and the 
authority’s diligence only requires that clarification 
be sought in the face of obvious errors that should 
have been detected when assessing the tender.45 This 
one of the manifestations of the general principle of good 
administration, ie the principle of proper functioning of the 
administration—which implies that ‘administrations are 
required to carry out their activities not only in accordance 
with the relevant legal rules but also in a professional manner 
and in keeping with the facts of common experience’ (ibid 
at 209). See also HP Nehl, Principles of Administrative 
Procedure in EC Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1999) 101-
165; and J Mendes, ‘Good Administration in EU Law and 
the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour’, 
EUI Working Paper Law 2009/09, available at http://hdl.
handle.net/1814/12101, last visited 17 March 2018. 
42 See Tideland Signal, EU:T:2002:232, paragraphs 37-
38, and cited case law. See also Antwerpse Bouwwerken, 
EU:T:2009:491.
43 Tideland Signal, EU:T:2002:232, paragraphs 37-38, and 
cited case law.
44 Tideland Signal, EU:T:2002:232, paragraph 37 ab initio.
45 See Belfass, EU:T:2008:160, paragraphs 65-71.
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is so particularly because, as clearly indicated by the 
CJEU, the presence of non-obvious errors and their 
subsequent amendment or correction might result in 
breaches of the principle of equal treatment.46 
On the whole, then, the CJEU case law has 
established the boundaries for the exercise of a 
not entirely discretional power to seek clarification, 
supplementation and correction of seemingly non-
compliant tenders that has as its main focus the 
prevention of discrimination between tenderers. 
Provided that discrimination is not at risk or is 
excluded through adequate procedural mechanisms, 
contracting authorities willing to ‘save’ non-
compliant tenders can adopt a possibilistic approach 
aimed at ensuring that the assessment of tenders and 
the award of the contract preserves the benefits of 
competition by adopting a functional rather than a 
formal approach to this issue.
3. Critical assessment of the post-2017 version of 
Article 72 of the PCPC
Against the backdrop of the condensed overview 
of the existing CJEU case law in the previous section, 
the paper now concentrates on the critical assessment 
of the post-2017 version of Article 72 of the PCPC 
and, in particular, on four main issues concerning: 
the existence of a mere discretionary power or a 
positive duty to seek clarifications, corrections or 
supplementations of tenders and their accompanying 
documentation (3.1); the constraints imposed on 
such power or duty (3.2); the desirability of unilateral 
tender corrections by the contracting authority 
(3.3); and the transparency of the correction, 
supplementation or clarification of tenders (3.4).
3.1 Power or duty to seek clarifications?
As mentioned in section 2 above, the case law 
of the CJEU falls short from creating a general duty 
to seek clarifications under any circumstances.47 As 
a matter of EU law, contracting authorities are not 
obliged to seek clarifications or demand explanations 
where the errors or shortcomings are not obvious 
(first prong),48 but can be constrained by a duty to 
seek clarifications or implement corrections where 
46 Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 8 May 1996, 
Adia interim v Commission, T-19/95, EU:T:1996:59, para-
graphs 43-49. Similarly, Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 26 February 2002, Esedra v Commission, 
T-169/00, EU:T:2002:40, paragraph 49; and Judgment of 
the Court of First Instance of 18 April 2007, Deloitte Busi-
ness Advisory v Commission, T-195/05, EU:T:2007:107, 
paragraph 102.
47 Slovensko, EU:C:2012:191, paragraphs 37-38.
48 See above (nn 45 & 46).
the terms of a tender themselves and the surrounding 
circumstances known to the authority indicate that the 
ambiguity probably has a simple explanation and can 
be easily resolved (second prong).49 The first prong of 
this doctrine (ie no general obligation) seems largely 
compatible with Article 56(3) of Directive 2014/24/
EU, inasmuch as it is formulated in enabling terms: 
‘contracting authorities may … request the economic 
operators concerned to submit, supplement, clarify or 
complete the relevant information or documentation’. 
However, it is worth bearing in mind that Member 
States can decide to preclude this possibility in their 
domestic transposition, which raises the question 
whether this would be compatible with the second 
prong of the doctrine.
Turning to Article 72(1) and (3) of the PCPC in its 
post-2017 formulation, it seems that the Portuguese 
transposition is in line with Article 56(3) of Directive 
2014/24/EU and with the broader CJEU case law. 
Firstly, Article 72(1) PCPC maintains the enabling 
approach of Article 56(3) and the first prong of the 
CJEU case law by establishing that a ‘contracting 
authority may ask competitors for any clarification 
of the submitted tenders that it deems necessary for 
the purpose of analysing and evaluating them’. A 
question can be raised here, however, on whether 
the enabling clause in Article 72(1) PCPC is too 
broad by referring to the possibility to ask for ‘any 
clarification deemed necessary’, whereas Article 
56(3) of Directive 2014/24/EU refers to the possibility 
to seek clarification of ‘relevant information or 
documentation’ and the case law requires that the 
need for the clarification is clear.50 However, beyond 
linguistic differences, it seems that both clauses will be 
subject to a general requirement of proportionality, 
which will modulate the exercise of this power by 
contracting authorities. 
Secondly, despite its more prescriptive content, 
Article 72(3) also seems in line with Article 56(3) of 
Directive 2014/24/EU, with maybe only an open 
query regarding whether five days is to be considered 
‘an appropriate time limit’. Given the limited space 
for the correction, supplementation or clarification 
of tenders, there is no strong indication to the 
contrary. In addition to that, Article 72(3) ensures 
compliance with the second prong of the case law by 
imposing on the contracting authority the obligation 
to ask candidates and tenderers for a correction 
or supplementation of ‘any irregularities in their 
applications or tenders that have been caused by the 
breach of non-essential formalities and that need to 
be corrected… as long as such correction does not 
affect competition and equal treatment’. A question 
49 Tideland Signal, EU:T:2002:232, paragraphs 37-38.
50 Archus and Gama, EU:C:2017:358, paragraph 29.
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arises here, however, as to whether the domestic rule 
goes beyond the second prong of the CJEU case law. 
As mentioned above (section 2), under EU law, a 
positive obligation to seek clarification or correction 
arises only where the shortcoming is obvious. 
Conversely, the presence of non-obvious errors 
and their subsequent amendment or correction 
might result in breaches of the principle of equal 
treatment.51 Therefore, it seems that the only EU law 
consistent interpretation of Article 72(3) PCPC is that 
the obligation to seek correction or supplementation 
of the applications and tenders only arises where the 
shortcomings are obvious—which may somehow be 
captured by the requirement that the shortcomings 
not only result from the breach of non-essential 
formalities, but also that they require correction (ie 
‘need to be corrected’). This is important because, 
otherwise, a contracting authority could be tempted 
to seek correction or supplementation of non-obvious 
errors and, provided it sought clarification from all 
candidates or tenderers in a non-discriminatory 
fashion (in procedural terms), it could be seen as 
not (formally) infringing the domestic Portuguese 
rule in Article 72(3) PCPC. Moreover, a systematic 
interpretation of Article 72(3) and (4) could lead to 
a purely domestic construction of the first provision 
that excluded the requirement for obviousness of the 
error or shortcoming under Article 72(3) because, 
that being an explicit requirement of Article 72(4) 
PCPC (see below 3.3), it could be argued that the 
Portuguese legislator could have also included it in 
the previous paragraph if it so wished—its absence 
thus justifying an interpretation not requiring 
obviousness. However, these arguments would fail to 
ensure compliance with the obligation of consistent 
interpretation with EU law.52 In my view, the obligation 
to demand clarifications under Article 72(3) can only 
be triggered by the existence of an obvious error—
which will naturally restrict its scope of application 
relative to the possibility for the contracting authority 
51 See above (n 46).
52 See the seminal Judgments of 10 April 1984, Von 
Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, C-14/83, 
EU:C:1984:153; and Harz v Deutsche Tradax, C-79/83, 
EU:C:1984:155. The principle was crystallised in the 
Judgment of 13 November 1990, Marleasing v Comercial 
Internacional de Alimentación, C-106/89, EU:C:1990:395; 
and the Judgment of 16 December 1993, Wagner Miret 
v Fondo de garantía salarial, C-334/92, EU:C:1993:945. 
Specifically in the field of public procurement, see Judgment 
of 22 June 1989, Fratelli Costanzo v Comune di Milano, 
C-103/88, EU:C:1989:256, paragraphs 28-33; and, more 
recently, Judgment of 18 December 2007, Frigerio Luigi 
& C., C-357/06, EU:C:2007:818, paragraphs 28-29; and 
Judgment of 15 May 2008, SECAP and Santorso, C-147/06, 
EU:C:2008:277, paragraph 22.
to seek clarifications under Article 72(1)—and this 
may be relevant in terms of preserving some space 
for executive discretion—although all types of 
clarifications (ie whether discretionary or mandatory) 
may well end up being constrained by the same sets 
of limitations, as discussed immediately below.
3.2 Boundaries of acceptable clarifications
Beyond the main difference between Article 72(1) 
and (3) in terms of the enforceability against the 
contracting authority of a duty to seek clarification 
(Art 72(3)) or the empowerment of the contracting to 
seek such clarification where necessary (Art 72(1)); a 
literal reading of Article 72(2) and (3) may lead to the 
understanding that the exercise of the power/duty are 
subjected to different limitations. Indeed, Article 72(2) 
comes to limit the discretionary exercise of the power 
to seek clarifications from an ex post perspective—
ie it does not bar the exercise of the power, but 
rather prevents the contracting authority from 
taking into account the clarifications, supplements 
or corrections obtained—where the explanations 
given by the respective competitors (i) contradict 
the information contained in the documents already 
submitted, (ii) alter or complete their attributes, or 
(iii) fill in omissions that would have determined 
the exclusion of the tenderer (as applicant) or its 
tender. On its part, Article 72(3) in fine excludes the 
mandatory correction or supplementation of tenders 
where doing so would ‘affect competition and equal 
treatment’. It is not clear whether this reflects an ex 
ante or an ex post approach. Moreover, Article 72(3) 
also embeds a more precise limitation, which forbids 
the acceptance of supplementary documentation 
except if it verifies ‘facts or qualities pre-existing the 
date for the submission of their application or tender’. 
In my view, there are two issues that require careful 
analysis. First, whether the requirements of Article 
72(2) and (3) are in line with CJEU case law. Second, 
whether they are mutually exclusive or cumulative, or 
whether they are simple conduits for the application 
of CJEU case law in Portugal.
On the first issue, I submit that while the constraints 
included in Article 72(2) are in line with CJEU case law, 
they are also insufficient to encapsulate the entirety 
of applicable constraints. Indeed, Article 72(2) PCPC 
only refers to the impossibility to formulate a new 
tender (ie contradict the terms of the previous tender, 
or alter or complete its attributes) or to provide 
documents which absence was subject to exclusion / 
rejection in the tender documentation. This is in line 
with the constraints identified as (ii) and (iv) in section 
2 (above), and thus fails to cover the additional 
requirements that: a request for clarification cannot 
be made until after the contracting authority has 
looked at all the tenders and must, as a general rule, 
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be sent in an equivalent manner to all undertakings 
which are in the same situation and must relate to 
all sections of the tender which require clarification 
(constraint (i)); as a general rule, the contracting 
authority must treat tenderers equally and fairly, in 
such a way that a request for clarification does not 
appear unduly to have favoured or disadvantaged 
the tenderer or tenderers to which the request was 
addressed, once the procedure for selection of 
tenders has been completed and in the light of its 
outcome (constraint (iii)); and, specifically in relation 
to documents, the additional constraint that a request 
‘to provide documents describing that candidate’s 
situation – such as a copy of its published balance 
sheet – [can only cover those] which can be objectively 
shown to pre-date that deadline’ (constraint (v)).
Still on this first issue, I submit that Article 72(3) 
PCPC also diverges from the CJEU case law in relation 
to constraint (v) requiring that additional documents 
‘objectively pre-date the deadline for applying to 
take part in a tendering procedure’. Indeed, taken 
literally, Article 72(3) disregards this constraint by 
swapping the focus of analysis of pre-existence from 
the date of creation of the document (as required by 
the CJEU case law) to the date of existence of the 
facts or circumstances reflected in the documents. 
On a flexible interpretation, Article 72(3) PCPC could 
seem to allow for the elaboration of the explanatory or 
additional documents after the expiry of the relevant 
deadline (ie expression of interest or submission of 
the tender, as applicable)—which, in my view, would 
run contrary to the CJEU case law. The remainder 
of Article 72(3) is not inconsistent with CJEU case 
law, and the reference to respect of competition and 
equal treatment must, in my view, be interpreted as a 
reference to that case law—both present and future. 
This leads to the analysis of the second issue.
As mentioned above, it is worth reflecting on 
whether Article 72(2) and (3) PCPC (the latter in part) 
are mutually exclusive or cumulative, or whether they 
are simple conduits for the application of CJEU case 
law in Portugal. I would submit that both provisions 
are affected by the duty of contracting authorities, 
review bodies and courts to interpret domestic law 
consistently with EU law. Therefore, both provisions 
cannot be seen as more than an anchor for the 
application of the CJEU case law discussed above 
(section 2) and, in the end, both provisions require 
compliance with the entirety of the constraints 
resulting therein (ie not only current constraints (i) to 
(v), but also any additional constraints derived from 
future case law).
3.3 Unilateral correction of tenders
Differently from the previous discussion, and 
generally in line with the second prong of CJEU case 
law requiring contracting authorities to discharge a 
positive duty to seek correction of obvious errors 
(above section 2),53 Article 72(4) PCPC imposes an 
obligation on every contracting authority to ‘rectify on 
its own the clerical or calculation errors contained in 
the applications or tenders, provided that the existence 
of the errors and the way in which they must be 
corrected are obvious to any observer’. The difficulty 
with this provision is not so much its compatibility 
with EU law, but rather its operationalisation. It is 
not clear that the contracting authority should be 
granted a power to unilaterally correct the content of 
the tenders it received, even if the way in which the 
correction should operate is obvious. This is so for 
two reasons, first, the open-ended standard created 
for the correction to be ‘obvious to anyone’ could 
generate one of two effects: (i) either a very limited 
application of the provision by cautious contracting 
authorities, or (ii) a very expansive limitation by risk-
taking contracting authorities. This could trigger issues 
in two dimensions. First, in relation to the ‘corrected’ 
tenderer. Second, in relation with other tenderers 
and, possibly, third parties. The second dimension will 
be discussed in relation to transparency requirements 
(below, section 3.4).
In relation to the correction or not of obviously 
erroneous tenders and its impact on the relationship 
between the contracting authority and the ‘corrected’ 
tenderer, I can think of two problematic issues. Firstly, 
it could well happen that what a contracting authority 
considers an obvious correction is not at all obvious, 
or acceptable, to the tenderer. In that case, the power 
of unilateral variation implicit in the duty to correct 
could result in the tenderer not being willing or able to 
deliver the contract in the ‘corrected’ terms. Secondly, 
the opposite could be true, and what would be an 
obvious correction in the eyes of the tenderer may 
not be equally clear to the contracting authority. In 
this case, the fact that Article 72(4) does not explicitly 
foresee a mechanism whereby the tenderer can 
prompt the contracting authority to undertake the 
‘obvious’ correction may also lead to litigation. Of 
course, both of these issues may or not be a problem 
depending on the existence of other rules in the 
PCPC or general Portuguese administrative law that 
discipline the behaviour of the contracting authority. 
However, following the logic in an emerging line of 
CJEU case law opposed to the reliance on general 
rules where that option is not self-evident to (foreign) 
tenderers,54 I would think that these are issues worth 
reconsidering or possibly clarifying. In my view, even 
if less immediate than a duty/power of unilateral 
53 See (n 43) and accompanying text.
54 By analogy, see Judgment of 2 June 2016, Pizzo, C-27/15, 
EU:C:2016:404.
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correction of tenders, a contradictory phase in the 
evaluation procedure would be preferable, to the 
effect that the contracting authority that intended 
to implement an ‘obvious’ correction would be 
obliged to communicate this situation to the relevant 
tenderer and allow it sufficient time (maybe five days, 
for consistency with Article 72(3)) to clarify whether 
it shared or not the contracting authority’s view.55 In 
the absence of agreement, arguably, the contracting 
authority should be barred from implementing 
the correction—due to the lack of ‘obviousness’ 
of the required changes—but it would be equally 
empowered (and arguably obliged) to reject the 
tender as effectively non-compliant.
3.4 Transparency issues
The final aspect of Article 72 PCPC that deserves 
comment concerns its last paragraph, which requires 
that requests for clarifications and relevant answers 
are ‘made available on an electronic platform used 
by the contracting authority and all applicants and 
tenderers shall be notified without delay’. From a 
perspective of full transparency, the scope of this 
provision seems insufficient because it only applies to 
clarifications, supplementations or corrections under 
paras 1 and 3 of Article 72. There is no clear rationale 
for the exclusion of corrections under Article 72(4) 
PCPC from this transparency mechanism, and this can 
create some problems and challenges if competing 
tenderers or even third parties take a different view 
on the obviousness of the unilateral correction. One 
of the arguments given by the CJEU not to impose 
a duty to seek clarifications is that there is a ‘risk 
of making the contracting authority appear to have 
negotiated with the tenderer on a confidential basis, 
in the event that that tenderer was finally successful’.56 
By excluding this type of correction from the ad hoc 
transparency requirement of Article 72(5) PCPC, this 
risk may be exacerbated. Conversely, and from the 
perspective of potential excesses in the transparency 
of procurement procedures,57 the entire provision 
55 Also by analogy, see the proposals in A Sanchez-Graells, 
‘“If it ain't broke, don't fix it”? EU requirements of admi-
nistrative oversight and judicial protection for public 
contracts’, in S Torricelli & F Folliot Lalliot (eds), Oversight 
and Challenges of Public Contracts (Brussels, Bruylant, 
2018) 495-534.
56 See above (n 36).
57 See KM Halonen, ‘Disclosure Rules in EU Public 
Procurement: Balancing between Competition and 
Transparency’ (2016) 16(4) Journal of Public Procurement 
528. See also A Sanchez-Graells, ‘The Difficult Balance 
between Transparency and Competition in Public 
Procurement: Some Recent Trends in the Case Law of the 
European Courts and a Look at the New Directives’ (2013) 
University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper No. 
13-11, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2353005, 
last accessed 17 March 2018.
may trigger criticism—unless it is not interpreted 
broadly and as requiring an automatic and 
unavoidable disclosure of the specific clarifications, 
supplementations or correction—as this could lead 
to perverse effects on competition in the relevant 
market. However, an analysis of this issue exceeds 
the possibilities of this paper and is better saved for 
some other occasion.
4. Conclusion
This paper has shown how, despite the sparsity 
of Article 56(3) of Directive 2014/24/EU, in its 
transposition, Member States must respect a much 
more detailed set of constraints that derive from 
the CJEU case law on clarification and correction of 
tenders for public contracts. Using the example of 
Article 72 of the Portuguese Code of Public Contracts 
after its 2017 reform linked to the transposition of 
the EU 2014 Public Procurement Package, the paper 
has reflected on the impact of the CJEU case law on 
the discretion left to Member States to create their 
own set of rules in this area. In particular, the paper 
has raised potential problems in the configuration of 
powers and duties to seek clarification or correction, 
as well as the applicable limits thereon, issues 
concerning the unilaterality of corrections and the 
transparency given to corrections, supplementations 
and clarifications of tenders for public contracts. 
Hopefully, the analysis in the paper will not only be 
useful to academics and practitioners in Portugal, but 
also to those interested in comparative analysis of EU 
procurement law.
